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Abstract
Multi-winner approval elections are seen in a variety of settings ranging from
academic societies and associations to public elections. In such elections, it is
often the case that ballot-length restrictions are enforced; that is, where voters
have a limit on the number of candidates which they can vote for. Despite
this common feature, there does not seem to be any theoretical justification for
ballot-length restrictions (Laslier and Van der Straeten [19]).
This work endogenously derives the set of voter best-response ballot lengths
under complete information and with general assumptions on voter utilities and
voting rules. These results provide justification for some ballot-length restric-
tions observed in practice, however when considering equilibrium outcomes our
analysis shows that this justification is no longer valid. Equilibrium analysis is
considered for voters with lazy and truth-bias second-order tendencies and the
equilibrium solution concept is pure-Nash equilibria.
The key insights show that ballot-length restrictions or institutional features
which make voting costly may lead to instability in election outcomes when
voters have diverse preferences, via the non-existence of equilibria. On the
other hand, when equilibria do exist they satisfy desirable properties which are
not guaranteed by equilibria attained under costless voting and in the absence
of ballot-length restrictions. In summary our results highlight a stark trade-off
between stable and desirable election outcomes.
Keywords: multi-winner elections, approval voting, ballot-length restrictions,
strategic voting, lazy and truth-bias
1. Introduction
In this paper we focus on multi-winner approval elections whereby voters
submit approval ballots over the candidate set and based on these a subset of
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candidates with some predetermined size is elected i.e. the ‘winning committee’.
Approval ballots are unranked ballots which voters use to express a subset of
candidates which they ‘approve’ of. The size, or length, of a given voter’s
approval ballot refers to the number of candidates which they approve of and
this number may vary across voters based on their preferences.
When voters have dichotomous preferences there is no issue with limiting
voter preference elicitation to approval ballots (Brams and Fishburn [4]) how-
ever in many settings, this is not a realistic assumption. Without assuming
dichotomous preferences, the restriction of preference elicitation to approval
ballots induces strategic behaviour which can lead to a voter varying both the
set of candidates which she approves and the length of her approval ballot
(Niemi [27]).
Multi-winner approval voting is currently used in academic societies, public
elections and the election of international officials. Academic societies such as
the American Mathematical Society, the Institute of Management Science and
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) utilise this voting
method. The latter has over 400,000 members as of 2016 making it the world’s
largest technical professional organisation. Approval-based methods are also
used in the election of seven regional government officials in Zurich, and for the
election of the secretary-general of the United Nations.
A common feature observed in practice is the enforcement of ballot-length
restrictions; that is, an upper bound on the number of candidates which a voter
may include in her approval ballot. For example the approval-based election for
the regional government representatives in Zurich restricts the number of candi-
dates a voter can approve to seven (Lachat et al. [17]) - which is also the number
of candidates to be elected. Another extremely common example is plurality
voting whereby a ‘one-vote-per-person’ rule is applied and a single candidate is
elected. However, it has been noted in the literature that there “does not seem
to [be] any specific theoretical property” to justify such restrictions (Laslier and
Van der Straeten [19])1.
This work considers strategic voters in a complete information, multi-winner
approval election with general and heterogenous utilities. Our results provide
a characterisation of voter best-response approval ballots lengths - leading to a
potential justification of ballot-length restrictions equal to the number of can-
didates to be elected. In particular, this provides some justification for the re-
strictions enforced by plurality voting and the previously mentioned elections in
Zurich. This result applies to a class of approval voting rules which includes the
most standard ‘AV-rule’ whereby the candidates receiving the highest number of
approvals are elected as winners until the winning committee (of predetermined
size) is filled.
1Under a restricted setting of voter preferences which are also dichotomous Aziz et al. [1]
show some desirable properties of not enforcing ballot-length restrictions. Also Elkind et
al. [12] show that the Bloc approval-based voting rule which requires voters to approve of pre-
cisely the number of candidates to be elected satisfies a desirable axiom called fixed majority.
However, both [1] and [12] consider a non-strategic environment.
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However our results, when considering (pure-Nash) equilibrium analysis,
show that this justification is misguided. If voters are incentivised to submit
‘shorter’ approval-ballots (i.e. approving a minimal number of candidates which
guarantees maximal utility) via increases to the cost of voting or the enforce-
ment of ballot-restrictions, then equilibria do not exist unless there is a high
degree of consensus among voter preferences. This suggests some level of insta-
bility. Conversely when no such incentives exists; for example when voting is
costless and in the absence of ballot-length restrictions, then we show that an
equilibrium always exists. The effect of these incentives on voter behaviour is
formalised via two commonly applied models of voters with second-order ten-
dencies referred to as laziness and truth-bias – see for example Desmedt and
Elkind [9], Dutta and Laslier [11], Elkind et al. [13], Endriss [15], and Xia and
Conitzer [32]. The former generalises the idea that if a voter can not affect
the election outcome they will abstain from voting, the latter implies that a
voter which multiple best-responses will strictly prefer a sincere best-response2.
These refinements lead to lazy-Nash and sincere-Nash (pure) equilibria.
Interestingly, we show that the relatively few equilibria which do exist, when
voting is costly and/or ballot-length restrictions are applied, satisfy desirable
properties which are not guaranteed to be satisfied when voting is costless and
in the absence of ballot-length restrictions. Thus, our results highlight a trade-
off between achieving stability and satisfying other desirable features of election
outcomes.
Contributions. Our contributions are three-fold: firstly, we present a general
yet analytically tractable model to study voter behaviour in multi-winner elec-
tions utilising a well-known class of voter utility functions; secondly, we provide
insights into the effect of ballot-length restrictions via analysis of best-response
behaviour and equilibria analysis; and thirdly, our results extend and comple-
ment the existing literature on single-winner approval elections.
Outline and structure. Section 2 provides a brief survey of the related litera-
ture, section 3 introduces the model formally and then section 4 provides our
key analysis of voter best response behaviour in the presence of ballot-length
restrictions. Lastly, section 5 considers equilibrium analysis of the standard
‘AV-rule’ when voters are either lazy or truth-biased. This provides a heuris-
tic comparison of the effect of ballot-length restrictions and costly voting on
equilibrium outcomes.
2. Related literature
Strategic voting in single-winner elections with preferential voting has been
heavily studied by previous scholars. However strategic voting in two closely
related areas; multi-winner elections and, approval-based elections have received
2It is shown in section 5.2 that at least one best-response ballot is also sincere.
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relatively little attention individually, let alone when studied in combination.
Multi-winner and single-winner elections are considered in Myserson [21], and
Cox [6, 7] for approval voting however voters are assumed to be sincere3. Brams
and Fishburn [4] consider strategic voters in single-winner approval elections
where voters have dichotomous preferences and both Niemi [27] and De Si-
nopoli et al. [8] provide analysis for voters with non-dichotomous preferences.
Three distinct incomplete information models of single-winner approval-based
elections with strategic voters have been formulated and studied by Myerson and
Weber [26], Laslier [18] and Myerson [23, 24, 25]. However none of these papers,
shed light on whether their results extend to the multi-winner setting, nor the
effect of restricting voter strategy spaces, via ballot-length restrictions. One no-
table exception which considers strategic voters in multi-winner approval-based
elections is Laslier and Van der Straeten [19] which will be discussed in greater
detail at the end of this section4.
Elkind et al. [13] study plurality (single-winner) elections with strategic vot-
ers, focusing on the effect of three different tie-breaking rules on voter behaviour
and pure Nash equilibria (PNE). The work analyses two models of strategic vot-
ers (lazy and truth-bias models) with complete information which builds on the
work of Desmedt and Elkind [9] and Obraztsova et al. [28]. Our work does not
focus on the effect of different tie-breaking rules but nonetheless complements
this body of work by providing some more general results for multi-winner ap-
proval elections which can be viewed as a generalisation of plurality voting.
In our equilibria analysis (section 5), we focus exclusively on lexicographic tie-
breaking and present a series of results for the multi-winner setting. When
restricting these results to the special case of single-winner voting we attain a
theorem of Elkind et al. [13] as a corollary (see Corollary 5 in section 5).
Laslier and Van der Straeten [19] consider strategic voting in multi-winner
elections under a specific voting rule and the assumption that voter utilities are
given by an additive sum (or equivalently an average utility). The paper focuses
on an incomplete information score uncertainty model which is related to the
work of Myerson and Weber [26]. Our work focuses on the complete information
setting but allows for a general class of voting rules, does not restrict voters to
have additive sum utilities and considers voters with second-order tendencies. In
addition our results provide insights into the relationship between voter utilities
and the number of candidates which they will optimally vote for, and the effect
of ballot-length restrictions.
3Strictly speaking the voters do follow a strategy, however it is determined solely by their
own cardinal utilities over candidates and do not depend on beliefs, or knowledge, of other
voters’ strategies.
4A number of computational and algorithmic papers consider multi-winner approval elec-
tions, however their focus differs substantial from this paper; some examples include Aziz et
al. [2], Endriss [14, 15], and Procaccia and Rosenschein [30].
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3. Model
3.1. Voters, candidates and preferences
This subsection provides a formal introduction to the model, voter utility
functions and characterisations of these functions. Some preliminary lemmas
are also stated which highlight the implications of our assumptions upon voter
utilities over committees (election outcomes) - these will be utilised in later
sections.
Let N be a set of voters and C be a set of candidates with representative
elements i and c, respectively. For each voter i ∈ N we express cardinal utilities
over the candidate set C via a utility function
ui : C → R
c 7→ ui(c).
We shall assume voters have strict preferences; that is, for all c, c′ ∈ C such that
c 6= c′ we have ui(c) 6= ui(c
′). Sometimes it will be convenient to express voter
preferences by the (strict) ordinal relation ≻i such that for c, c′ ∈ C
c ≻i c
′ ⇐⇒ ui(c) > ui(c
′).
For clarity we have assumed that all voters have strict preferences however,
all of the results can be naturally extended to cover weak preferences %i by
considering equivalence classes of candidates for each voter i ∈ N .
Under approval-based voting each voter i ∈ N submits an approval ballot
Ai ⊆ C which is a subset of candidates that she will declare her ‘approval’ for.
Note that Ai is an unranked ballot and the size, or length, of the ballot |Ai| may
vary across voters. We refer to the list A = (A1, . . . , An) of approval ballots as
the ballot profile.
We will consider approval-based multi-winner voting rules that take as an
input a tuple (N,C,A, k) of voters N , candidates C, a ballot profile A and a
positive integer k ≤ |C|. The output or election outcome is a subset W ⊆ C
of size k. We will refer to the set W as the winning set or winning committee.
Throughout the committee size will be denoted by k. Definitions and results
will often be presented without reference to the parameter k but should be
understood that k is some fixed positive integer no greater than |C|.
In the multi-winner approval setting a committee, say W ⊆ C with |W | =
k ≥ 1, is elected and hence to describe voter preferences over election outcomes,
rather than candidates, it is necessary to extend each voter’s utility function
ui(·) to a set-extension utility Ui(·). A set-extension utility provides a functional
form which extends a utility function from candidates to the real line,
ui : C → R,
to a utility function from subsets of candidates of size k to the real line,
Ui : 2
C |k → R,
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where 2C |k denotes the subset of the power-set of C which contains sets of size
k.
In this paper we assume OWA (order weighted average) set-extensions which
were introduced by Yager [33]. OWA utilities are of the following form: For a
given voter i ∈ N , letW ⊆ C of size k and consider a relabelling of the elements
of W such that
W = {c1, . . . , ck}, where cj ≻i cj+1 for all j < k.
Voter i’s OWA set-extension utility, derived from ui : C → R, is
Ui(W ) =
k∑
j=1
λ
(i)
j ui(cj) where λ
(i)
j ≥ 0 for all j ≤ k. (1)
Note that each coefficient λ
(i)
j is not associated with any particular candidate
but rather with the position of a candidate within the committeeW (with respect
to ≻i).
To avoid degenerate cases we assume at least one λ
(i)
j > 0. This assumption
is simply for convenience, if for some voter i ∈ N λij = 0 for all j our analysis
would not be affected since any such voter would be indifferent between all
election outcomes and could be assumed to optimally not participate in the
election i.e Ai = ∅. Note that the utility can be compactly written as a dot
product in Rk
Ui(W ) = λ
(i) · uˆi(W ), (2)
where λ(i) = (λ
(i)
1 , . . . , λ
(i)
k ) and uˆi(W ) = (ui(c1), . . . , ui(ck)) is an ordered
(descending) vector of utility values attained from each candidate in W . Thus,
when
(i) λ
(i)
1 = 1 and λ
(i)
j = 0 for all j > 1 we attain the best set-extension;
whereby a voter only attains utility from their most preferred candidate
in W ,
(ii) if λ
(i)
k = 1 and λ
(i)
j = 0 for all j < k we attain the worst set-extension;
whereby a voter only attains utility from their least preferred candidate
in W ,
(iii) if λ
(i)
j = 1 for all j then we attain the natural additive utility (or equiva-
lently the average utility); whereby a voter’s utility from W is simply the
sum of the utility of each candidate in W .
More generally we only enforce the nonnegative restriction that λ
(i)
j ≥ 0 for all
j ≤ k as in (1). This restriction has the immediate implication that a voter
always weakly prefers a committee W over W ′ (i.e. Ui(W ) ≥ Ui(W ′)) if W is
attained from swapping a candidate c′ ∈ W ′ with a more preferred candidate
c ∈W . This is formalised in the following lemma.
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Lemma 1. Let W ⊆ C and suppose there exists c ∈W, c′ /∈ W such that c′ ≻i c
then
Ui(W ∪ {c
′}\{c}) ≥ Ui(W ).
Proof. Consider the dot product interpretation of voter utilities (2). First note
that for any fixed vector λ(i) ∈ Rk such that λ(i) ≥ 0 (component-wise inequal-
ity) the dot product function
f : Rk → R
x 7→ λ(i) · x
is a weakly increasing function. Further, if c′ ≻i c then uˆi(W ∪ {c′}\{c}) ≥
uˆi(W ) (component-wise inequality). Combining these two facts completes the
proof.
Notice that despite our assumption that voters have strict preferences over
C, a voter’s OWA set-extension utility Ui over committees need not be strict.
Definition 1. [j∗ set-extension]
Given a voter i with OWA utility set-extension, if j∗ is the smallest integer such
that
λ
(i)
ℓ = 0 for all ℓ > j
∗,
then we say that voter i has a j∗ set-extension utility. If no such j∗ exist we
define j∗ = k by default.
Applying this definition we see that the best-set extension is a j∗ = 1 set-
extension, whilst both the worst-set extension and the natural additive utilities
are j∗ = k set-extensions.
In the definition above we have denoted voter i’s set-extension value by j∗.
As will be seen later, this paper allows distinct voters in N to have distinct
set-extension values; that is, heterogenous utility functions and set-extension
values. When this is important will we denote a voter i’s set-extension value by
j∗(i).
3.2. Multi-winner voting rules
In this paper we consider a class of multi-winner approval voting rules which
includes the commonly used AV-rule whereby the k candidates with the highest
approval scores are elected, and lexicographic tie-breaking is used. The class is
a subfamily of non-degenerate best-k scoring rules. Best-k scoring rules were
introduced and characterised by Elkind et al. [12]. Our focus on this class derives
from two monotonicity properties – relative rank monotonicity and monotonic
robustness (to be defined later) – satisfied by such (non-degenerate) rules which
will later be shown to lead to a characterisation of voter best-response behaviour.
We begin by providing a formal definition of best-k scoring rules under
approval-based voting. For further details, properties and a more general defi-
nition of best-k scoring rules we refer the reader to [12].
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Definition 2. [Best-k score rule (approval-based)]
Given a candidate set C, a set of voters N and a ballot profile A, let f(c, A)
be a (scoring) function mapping a candidate and ballot profile pair (c, A) to
a real number such that a weak order over C can be formed. A multi-winner
voting rule which elects the candidates in the top k positions into the winning
committee W is a best-k score rule (deterministic tie-breaking when necessary).
The standard AV-rule is a member of the best-k scoring rule family. To fit
with the above definition we define the scoring function as
f(c, A) = |{i ∈ N : c ∈ Ai}|. (3)
Thus, f(c, A) denotes the number of voters who included the candidate c in their
approval ballot Ai. This is referred to as an approval score. The best-k rule
then select the k candidates with highest f(c, A) values (i.e. highest approval
scores) using a tie-breaking rule where necessary. However, the family of best-k
scoring rules also includes dictatorial rules whereby a single voter determines
the entire election, or predetermined election rules whereby the candidates to be
elected are determined before (or independently) of the approval ballot profile
A. These two rules are in some sense degenerate and for this reason we focus
on what we call non-degenerate best-k scoring rules.
To avoid degenerate voting rules we assume that all voters are treated equally
(but candidates need not be). First, given an approval ballot profile A define
S(c, A) = {i ∈ N : c ∈ Ai} and s(c, A) = |S(c, A)|.
That is, S(c, A) denotes the set of voters approving of candidate c under the
ballot profile A and s(c, A) denotes the approval score (or equivalently, the num-
ber of approving voters). We define the following subfamily of non-degenerate
voting rules.
Definition 3. [Non-degenerate best-k score rule (approval-based)]
Let f(c, A) be a (scoring) function for a best-k score rule. The function is said
to be non-degenerate if in addition to Definition 2
(i) the function only depends on the candidate, and the number of approvals
f(c, A) = g(c, s(c, A))
(ii) the function g : C × R → R is strictly increasing in the second argument
and g(c, 0) = 0 for all c ∈ C.
Note that any non-degenerate best-k scoring rule necessarily ensures
anonymity, hence a dictatorial rule is degenerate. Also the condition g(c, 0) = 0
implies that a predetermined election rule is also degenerate. The standard AV-
rule (3) is of course non-degenerate. Other less-standard election rules are also
non-degenerate for example; candidates need not be treated equally this would
be achieved with the following scoring function
f(c, A) = λ(c) s(c, A),
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where λ : C → R>0.
We now define the key monotonicity properties ensured by non-degenerate
best-k rules which will be crucial for characterising voter behaviour.
Recall that a voter i ∈ N submits an approval ballot denoted by Ai ⊆ C.
Suppose c ∈ C such that c /∈ Ai (i.e. candidate c is not approved by voter i in
Ai) we call the alternate approval ballot
A′i = Ai ∪ {c},
a reinforcement of c with respect to Ai. We say that a ballot profile A
′ =
(A′1, . . . , A
′
n) reinforces c relative to another ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) if
there exists some ballot A′i which reinforces c relative to Ai and all other ballots
are unchanged. Throughout we shall use the convention that given a ballot
profile A we denote the election outcome W =WA.
We now define two monotonicity properties which are satisfied by all non-
degenerate best-k voting rules and are sufficient conditions for our results to
apply.
The first monotonicity property captures the standard notion of candidate
monotonicity by requiring that a candidate c ∈ WA must still be elected under
any alternate ballot A′ which reinforces c. However, the property also extends
to instances where another candidate, say c′ ∈ C, receives less approvals and
then ensures that c must still be elected. Informally the property captures
the notion that if an elected candidate’s approval score weakly increases, say
c ∈ WA, whilst all other candidates receive weakly lower approvals under A′
then it must still be the case that c ∈WA′ .
Definition 4. [Relative rank monotonicity]
Let (N,C,A, k) be a voting instance with outcome WA and let c ∈ WA. Let A
′
be a ballot profile such that
s(c, A′) ≥ s(c, A) and s(c′, A′) ≤ s(c′, A) ∀c′ ∈ C\{c},
then c ∈ WA′ .
The second property we introduce is called monotonic robustness5 This
property captures the idea that if only a single candidate c ∈ C position is
improved then the only possible change to the winning committee is that c
becomes elected. If c was already elected then monotonic robustness implies
candidate monotonicity.
Definition 5. [Monotonically-robust]
Let (N,C,A, k) be a voting instance with outcome WA, let c ∈ C and A′ be a
reinforcement of c. A voting rule is said to be monotonically robust if whenever
WA 6=WA′ =⇒ WA′ = {c} ∪
(
WA\{c
′}
)
for some c′ ∈ WA.
5Monotonic-robustness implies 1-robustness in the sense of Bredereck et al. [5].
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Proposition 1. All non-degenerate best-k voting rules satisfy relative rank
monotonicity and monotonic robustness.
Proof. Given a non-degenerate best-k voting rule with (scoring) function f we
shall show that both properties are satisfied.
We begin with relative rank monotonicity: Consider voting instance with
outcome WA and c ∈ WA and let A
′ be a ballot profile such that
s(c, A′) ≥ s(c, A) and s(c′, A′) ≤ s(c′, A) ∀c′ ∈ C\{c}.
Since c ∈WA it follows that f(c, A) is among the top-k scores (when taking the
tie-breaking rule into account). Now consider f(c, A′) = g(c, s(c, A′)), since g is
strictly increasing in the second argument it follows that
f(c, A′) ≥ f(c, A).
Furthermore, for any c′ ∈ C\{c} it follows that f(c′, A′) ≤ f(c′, A).Thus, if c
was among the top-k scores under A it must also be among the top-k scores
under A′ – we conclude that c ∈WA′ .
We now prove that monotonic robustness holds: Let c ∈ C and let A′ be
a reinforcement of c relative to ballot profile A – this means that s(c, A′) =
s(c, A)+1 and s(c′, A′) = s(c′, A) for all other c′ ∈ C. Thus, f(c′, A) = f(c′, A′)
for all c′ 6= c and f(c, A′) > f(c, A). It follows that if WA 6= WA′ it must be
that f(c, A) was not among the top-k scores under A, but f(c, A′) is among the
top-k score sunder A′. Furthermore, this is the only change and so the single
candidate c′ ∈ C with the k-th best score under A is replaced in WA′ with the
reinforced candidate c. This completes the proof.
Some of our work applies to voting rules which only satisfy rank relative
monotonicity but not necessarily monotonic robustness – any such voting is
necessarily outside of the family of non-degenerate best-k rules. Our proofs are
always proven with explicit reference to which properties are required, thus it
will be clear when monotonic robustness is not required.
4. Ballot-length restrictions and minimal best response approval bal-
lots
This section considers the impact of ballot-length restrictions on voter be-
haviour - in particular, whether and when such a restriction will prevent a voter
from submitting their otherwise ‘optimal’ ballot.
Ballot-length restrictions are common in practice however, it is unclear for
what purpose (Laslier and Van der Straeten [19]). A potential argument is that
ballot-length restrictions simply reduce the number of votes without affecting
the election outcome. Indeed, as seen in the previous section a voter may be
indifferent between all ballot entries and so a ballot-length restriction may assist
in reducing the complications around vote counting whilst not affecting a voters
best-response action and the election outcome.
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We show that ballot-length restrictions can in some instances prevent a voter
from submitting any ballot which would be a best-response in the absence of
such restrictions. In fact whether, or not, a voter is affected directly by the
restriction can be determined via the value of their j∗ set-extension.
Interestingly we find that when the ballot-length restriction equals the num-
ber of candidates to be elected no voter will ever be prevented from submitting
a ballot which is also a BR ballot in the absence of restrictions. This coincides
with ballot-length restrictions observed in real-world elections such as plurality
voting or the regional Zurich election (mentioned in the introduction) whereby
seven winning candidates are to be elected and voters can approve of at most
seven candidates.
We begin by formally defining a best response (BR) and minimal best re-
sponse (MBR) approval ballot and a ballot-length restriction.
Definition 6. [Best response (BR) and minimal best response (MBR) ballots]
Given a voter i ∈ N , an approval ballot Ai is a best-response (BR) ballot to A−i
if
Ui(W(Ai,A−i)) ≥ Ui(W(A′i,A−i)) ∀A
′
i ∈ 2
C ,
where 2C is the power set of C. We denote the set of best-response ballots to
A−i for voter i by Bi(A−i). A ballot Ai ∈ Bi(A−i) is minimal best response
(MBR) ballot if
|Ai| ≤ |A
′
i| ∀A
′
i ∈ Bi(A−i).
Remark 1. The size of a minimal best-response ballot is unique. However,
minimal best-response ballots need not be unique even under the strict preference
assumption over C. With the additional assumption of ‘full-rank’ set-extensions
MBR ballots become unique (this additional assumption is introduced and dis-
cussed in section 5).
We now define an R ballot-length restriction which is a feature of voting rule
which limits the size of valid voter approval ballot i.e. |Ai| ≤ R. We also define
an R ballot-length restriction to be constraining if there exists instances where
a voter is prevented from submitting an approval ballot Ai which would be a
best response if no restrictions was enforced; that is |Ai| > R.
Definition 7. [R ballot-length restriction]
A voting rule which only permits approval ballots Ai such that |Ai| ≤ R for some
positive integer R, is referred to as an R ballot-length restriction. If R ≥ |C| =
m we say the voting rule is unrestricted.
Given a voter i ∈ N , we say that an R ballot-length restriction is constrain-
ing for voter i if there exists an instance A−i such that for every BR ballot (in
the unrestricted setting) Ai we have
|Ai| > R,
and hence Ai can not be submitted.
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Note that in the definition above for a constraining R ballot-length restric-
tion we could equivalently write the condition in terms of the size of a MBR
ballot Ai since this implies the inequality for all BR ballots.
The following key lemma provides a characterisation of the size of a voters
minimal best response ballot based on their j∗ set-extension utility in the pres-
ence of a ballot-length restriction. The lemma states that a voter who derives
utility from some function of their top j∗ most preferred candidates in a com-
mittee can achieve maximal utility, under unilateral deviations, by submitting
a ballot of size no larger than j∗ in the absence of a ballot-length restriction.
However, if an R ballot length restriction is enforced such that R < j∗ then
there are instances where the voter will be strictly worse off.
The intuition for the result is that if a voter’s best response was to submit
a ballot of size greater than j∗ but only gains utility from j∗ candidates in the
committee, say C′, then any approval/vote for a candidate not in C′ could be
removed without reducing the voters utility.
Lemma 2. [The ‘how long is a piece of string?’ Lemma]
Let i ∈ N be a voter with j∗ set-extension. In the absence of a ballot-length
restriction voter i’s MBR Ai is such that
|Ai| ≤ j
∗.
If an R ballot-length restriction with R < j∗ is enforced then the restriction is
constraining – in particular, there exists voting instances such that voter i will
be strictly worse off under unilateral deviations.
Proof. Let Ai be a BR ballot to A−i with outcome W . Label the elements of
W according to voter i’s (strict) preferences i.e.
W = {c1, . . . , ck}
such that cj ≻i cj+1 for all j < k.
From the j∗ set-extension utility we have
Ui(W ) =
k∑
j=1
λ
(i)
j ui(cj) =
j∗∑
j=1
λ
(i)
j ui(cj),
and so voter i attains utility from only candidates {c1, . . . , cj∗} ⊆ W . Notice
that since W is the outcome under a BR ballot Ui(W ) is the maximum achiev-
able utility for voter i when facing ballot profile A−i.
To prove the first claim it suffices to show that a BR ballot exists of size at
most j∗. For the purpose of a contradiction suppose that Ai is a MBR ballot of
size greater than j∗, we shall construct an alternate approval ballot A′i which is
of size j∗. Define A′i as follows
A′i = Ai\(Ai\{c1, . . . , cj∗}),
note that any candidate in Ai\{c1, . . . , cj∗} is removed from Ai to form A
′
i.
Let W ′ be the corresponding outcome from A′ = (A′i, A−i). In this election,
the approval scores of candidates in Ai\{c1, . . . , cj∗} strictly decrease, whilst
all other candidates’ approval scores are unchanged. Thus, by rank-relative
monotonicity it must be the case that {c1, . . . , cj∗} ⊆W ′. It follows that
Ui(W
′) ≥ Ui(W ) (4)
since voter i’s top j∗ most preferred candidates from W i.e. {c1, . . . , cj∗}, are
still contained in W ′. However, since W provides maximal utility it must be
that equality holds in (4), thus A′i is also a BR ballot. Furthermore,
|A′i| ≤ j
∗.
This is a contradiction since Ai was assumed to be a MBR ballot, yet A
′
i achieves
the same utility but is of strictly smaller size.
For the second claim, consider an R ballot-length restriction with R < j∗.
Let C′ ⊆ C be voter i’s top j∗ preferred candidates in C. Suppose that voter i
faces a ballot profile A−i such that for all c ∈ C
f(c, A−i) = 0.
That is all voters in N\{i} submit an empty approval ballot and so voter i can
completely determine the election outcome. If the voting rule uses a tie-breaking
method which leads to W ∩ C′ = ∅ then voter i’s MBR ballot is
Ai = C
′,
of size j∗. However, this is not a valid ballot since an R ballot-length restriction
(R < j∗) is enforced. It follows that voter i’s BR among valid ballots leads to
strictly less utility than if the ballot-length restriction was not enforced.
We now present a series of corollaries which follow immediately from
Lemma 2 and Definition 7. These corollaries have direct policy implications
regarding the assumptions required on voter utilities to justify a ballot-length
restriction as being non-constraining. With the exception of Corollary 1 the
assumptions are strong and unlikely to hold in reality.
The first corollary states that if voters can vote for no more than the number
of candidates to be elected (i.e R = k) then the ballot-length restriction is non-
constraining. As mentioned previously, this coincides with real-world approval
elections observed in practice. The intuition is as follows: if committee of size
k is to be elected then each voter’s utility depends on some function of these k
candidates. If a voter had a best response ballot of size greater than k, under
complete information, at least one of these approvals/votes is unnecessary since
only k candidates are being elected.
Corollary 1. If R = k then the ballot-length restriction is non-constraining.
In particular, plurality voting (single-winner) is non-constraining.
The second corollary states that if the common restriction of ‘one-vote-per-
person’ is applied to a multi-winner election then this is only non-constraining
to voters in one situation whereby voters only derive utility from their most pre-
ferred candidate elected into the committee – this is indeed a strong assumption.
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Corollary 2. Plurality voting in a multi-winner setting is non-constraining if
and only if all voters have j∗ = 1 set-extension utility.
The third corollary states that a ballot-length restriction is only non-
constraining for voters who derive utility from a relatively small number of
candidates in the committee (i.e. low j∗(i) set-extension value). This suggests
that voters with relatively narrow utilities with respect to the winning com-
mittee; for example only attaining utility from their top few most preferred
candidates in W , are less likely to be affected by a ballot-length restrictions. It
follows that ballot-length restrictions will disadvantage voters who derive utility
holistically from the winning committee.
Corollary 3. Consider an R ballot-length restriction, this is non-constraining
when every voter has a j∗(i) set-extension utilities such that j∗(i) ≤ R for all
i ∈ N . If this is not the case, it will be constraining for the subset of voters with
j∗(i) > R.
We conclude that ballot-length restrictions of size R < k will affect dif-
ferent voters to different extents, and because of this inequality, it is unclear
whether ballot-length restrictions are ever fully justified without strong assump-
tions upon voter j∗(i) set-extension values.
5. Equilibrium analysis: costly voting and ballot-length restrictions
This section presents analysis for two behavioural tendencies of voters; lazi-
ness and truth-bias. Lazy voting refers to when voters would rather abstain
then to vote when their vote makes no difference to the election outcome, whilst
truth-bias voting has voters who prefer to choose sincere actions (to be de-
fined) among their set of strategically optimal actions (so long as this is still a
best-response). Both of these tendencies have been presented previously in the
literature6 however, we extend them to the multi-winner setting and provide
equilibrium analysis in this new setting. In the multi-winner setting lazy voting
is characterised by voters submitting minimal best-response ballots - since this
is the minimal amount of ‘effort’, or votes, required to attain maximal utility.
The purpose of our focus on lazy and truth-bias voting is to capture the
impact of institutional features which increase the cost of voting or enforce
ballot-length restrictions. Lazy voting tendencies can be modelled via positive
but sufficiently small cost to voting as in Xia and Conitzer [32], in the extreme
case a ballot-length restriction may force a voter to submit a minimal best-
response ballot by making any other best-response ballot invalid. In the less
extreme case, it may simply encourage lazy voting. The opposite tendency
is truth-bias which is more likely to occur when voting is costless and ballot-
length restrictions are absent. If ballot-length restrictions are present a sincere
and best-response ballot may not be valid.
6See for example Desmedt and Elkind [9], Dutta and Laslier [11], Elkind et al. [13], En-
driss [15], and Xia and Conitzer [32].
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Our key insight shows that when voters have diverse preferences a lazy equi-
librium is unlikely to exist whilst under truth-bias voting an equilibrium always
exists. This suggest a sense of instability when voters are lazy which can be
inferred as an indirect and adverse effect of increases to the cost of voting or
the introduction of ballot-length restrictions. However, and perhaps surpris-
ingly, when lazy equilibria do exists they are guaranteed to satisfy a desirable
property which is not guaranteed under a truth-bias equilibrium.
As mentioned we consider voters with behavioural tendencies, or secondary
preferences. This modelling choice is in part motivated by the observation
of several scholars that (Nash) equilibrium analysis of strategic voting often
shows a plethora of equilibria - many which seem ‘unreasonable’ and are not
useful as predictors of behaviour. One method for refining these equilibria is
to add a secondary preference, or tendency, of voters such that when there
are multiple optimal actions at the voter’s disposal they select an action based
on this secondary preference. This additional feature also addresses the key
difficulty highlighted by Cox [7] when analysing equilibria of approval voting
systems as summarised in the following quote “voters have such a wide choice
of ballots, it is not clear, in general how to forecast their votes simply on the
basis of their preference ranking of candidates”.
The following example illustrates what seem to be ‘unreasonable’ pure-Nash
equilibria (PNE).
Example 1. Let C = {a, b, c}, N = {1, 2, 3}, k = 1 and suppose all voters have
the following strict preferences
≻1,≻2,≻3: b, a, c.
That is, all voters prefer candidate b to a and prefer candidate a to c. If the
candidate with the highest number of approvals is elected (i.e the standard ‘AV-
rule’) then a PNE of W = {c} can be supported by all voters submitting the
approval ballot Ai = {c}. This is a PNE despite all voters having identical
preferences and c being the least preferred candidate. Similar approvals can
be constructed to show that any other candidate in C can also be elected in
equilibrium.
All results that follow7 are for the standard ‘AV-rule’, whereby the k can-
didates with highest approval scores are elected and ties are broken via a lexi-
cographic priority ordering (predetermined and deterministic). We shall denote
the lexicographic ordering/relation by ⊲. This specific rule belongs to the fam-
ily of non-degenerate best-k scoring rules and hence the results from previous
sections hold.
Assumption 1. The results in this section focus on the standard ‘AV-rule’,
whereby the k candidates with highest approval scores are elected and ties and
7One exception is Theorem 3 which holds more generally for non-degenerate best-k rules
and is stated with this more general condition.
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broken via a lexicographic priority ordering. This rule belongs to the family of
non-degenerate best-k scoring rules. This assumption will be assumed without
being explicitly stated in the remaining results.
5.1. Lazy voting and lazy Nash
In this subsection we focus on ‘lazy’ voting whereby a voter wishes to abstain
from voting when her vote can never make a profitable change to the election
outcome. By extension, when it is profitable to vote for multiple candidates
lazy voting requires that voters choose a utility maximising ballot of the smallest
cardinality, or length, as possible. That is, a lazy voter always chooses a minimal
best response (MBR) ballot.
We begin by formally defining lazy voting and lazy equilibria. We then
turn to analysis of the existence and properties of lazy-equilibria in the multi-
winner setting. We provide a dichotomous characterisation of lazy-equilibria
in relation to a set of ‘most preferred candidates’ which depends of voter j(i)
set-extension values. This highlights a desirable property which is guaranteed
by lazy-equilibria. This result is followed by a necessary and sufficient condition
for lazy-equilibria in one of the characterisation and a necessary condition in
the other characterisation. When translating these results to the single-winner
setting we attain a result of Elkind et al. [13] as a corollary.
Definition 8. [Lazy voting]
We shall say voters engage in lazy voting when given A−i they choose an ap-
proval ballot Ai which is a minimal best response (MBR) ballot to A−i. That
is, given two best-response ballots Ai and A
′
i, Ai is strictly preferred to Ai if
|Ai| < |A
′
i|.
Note that the lazy voting action only applies to best-response ballots and
hence can be viewed as a second-order tendency since the preference for shorter
approval ballots is only applied after first maximising utility from the election
outcome.
Definition 9. [Lazy-PNE]
An election outcome W is a lazy-PNE supported by ballot profile A if no voter
has an incentive to unilaterally deviate under lazy voter preferences. We denote
an equilibrium pair by (W,A).
It follows that a lazy-PNE (W,A) occurs if and only if for every voter i ∈ N ,
Ai is a MBR ballot to A−i.
Recall that the number of approvals a candidate c ∈ C attains under ballot
profile A is denoted by s(c, A). Also recall that under the standard ‘AV-rule’ in
a k multi-winner election the candidates with k highest approval scores s(c, A)
are elected (applying lexicographic tie-breaking when necessary).
The following proposition provides a useful observation of lazy-equilibrium
approval scores. The observation is that at most k candidates receive precisely
one approval and all other candidates receive zero in equilibrium. The result is
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intuitive since voters are lazy and if k candidates are to be elected – any vote
for an unelected candidate can not be a minimal best response. Furthermore,
if any of the k elected candidates, say c, has more than one approval votes –
since unelected candidates have zero votes – a lazy voter with a vote for c could
remove this and not change the election outcome under unilateral deviations.
Proposition 2. Under a lazy-PNE, say (W,A),
s(c, A) = 0 ∀c /∈ W.
That is, at most k candidates can receive a positive share of approval votes.
Furthermore,
s(c, A) ≤ 1 ∀c ∈ W.
Proof. For the first statement: Assume (W,A) is a lazy-PNE and suppose for
the purpose of a contradiction that s(c′, A) > 0 for some c′ /∈ W . Let i ∈ N be
a voter such that c′ ∈ Ai, note that Ai must be a MBR ballot. Now suppose
that i submits the alternate approval ballot A′i = Ai\{c
′}, then based on the
relative rank monotonicity property the winning committee does not change.
Thus, it must be that Ai was not a MBR which is a contradiction.
For the final statement: Applying the first statement we have that s(c′, A) =
0 for all c′ /∈ W , it follows that at most k candidates receive a positive share
of approvals. Now for the purpose of a contradiction suppose that s(c, A) ≥ 2
for some c ∈ W . Let i ∈ N be a voter such that c ∈ Ai, note that Ai must be
a MBR ballot. Now if voter i submits the alternate ballot A′i = Ai\{c}, then
only candidate c receives a change in approval score. Furthermore, candidate
c still has a positive number of approvals (i.e. at least 1 approval) and so is
still among the top k candidates in terms of highest approvals s(·, A). It follows
that candidate c is still elected and the election outcome is unchanged. Thus,
it must be that Ai was not a MBR which is a contradiction.
It was noted in Desmedt and Elkind [9] that a lazy-PNE need not exist
under the single-winner plurality voting setting. This setting is a special case of
our multi-winner approval election when setting k = 1. Notice that any ballot-
length restriction R has no effect under the assumption of lazy voting in the
single-winner setting (k = 1). We provide a statement of the k = 1 result below
and simply note that it is easy to construct examples where the same conclusion
is reached for k > 1.
This non-existence of lazy-equilibria, or instability of lazy voting, stems from
voter incentives to abstain (or vote for a minimal number of candidates) from
the election when their vote is not pivotable. This in turn means that other
voters are more likely to be pivotable since in effect there are less votes and less
‘participating’ voters. This push and pull of incentives for lazy voters to vote
minimally but also exploit instances where their vote is pivotable can lead to
examples where a lazy-equilibrium does not exist.
Proposition 3 (See Desmedt and Elkind [9]). A lazy-PNE need not exist even
in single-winner elections (i.e. k = 1).
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We now define a voter’s ‘ideal’ set which will later be used to characterise
lazy-equilibria.
Given a voter i ∈ N with j∗(i) set-extension utility we define voter i’s ideal
set as
W ∗i = {voter i’s top j
∗(i) most preferred candidates in C}. (5)
It is easy to see that if voter i’s ideal set is contained in the election outcome,
W ∗i ⊆W , then voter i attains maximal utility from the election outcome W .
The following lemma shows that in fact a strict increase in utility is attained
when moving from an election outcome W ′ such that W ∗i 6⊆ W
′ to an election
outcome W such that W ∗i ⊆W . The proof is left to the appendix however, the
intuition is simple; a voter i who derives utility from their top j∗(i) preferred
candidates in the committee W ( C can do no better than having their top
j∗(i) preferred candidates in C, i.e. W ∗i , elected.
Lemma 3. Let i ∈ N be a voter with j∗(i) set-extension utility and ideal com-
mittee W ∗i . If W,W
′ ⊆ C of size k and W ∗i ⊆W but W
∗
i 6⊆W
′, then
Ui(W ) > Ui(W
′).
As seen in Lemma 3, a voter i with her ideal set W ∗i contained in the
election outcome strictly prefers this to any other outcome not containing W ∗i .
It is natural to suspect that when W ∗i is not contained in W but contains more
elements of the ideal set W ∗i than W
′, then Ui(W ) > Ui(W
′). This however is
not true in general. For example consider a voter i with preferences
≻i: a, b, c, d
k = 2, and a j∗(i) = 2 set-extension utility such that λ
(i)
1 = 0 then her utility is
Ui(W ) = λ
(i)
1 ui(c1) + λ
(i)
2 ui(c2) = 0 ui(c1) + ui(c2).
That is, voter i attains utility only from their least preferred candidate in the
election outcome of size k = 2. Thus W ∗i = {a, b} however
Ui({c, d}) = Ui({b, d}) = Ui({a, d}) = ui(d).
Thus, we do not attain strict preference for committees which contain more ideal
set members W ∗i . Note, however that this is no longer the case if λ
(i)
1 > 0. This
provides (technical) motivation for considering cases where λ
(i)
1 > 0 – or more
generally, a voter with j∗ set-extension has λ
(i)
j > 0 for all j ≤ j
∗. We call this
requirement a ‘full-rank’ set-extension and define the concept formally below.
This is utilised to provide a characterisation of the existence of lazy-PNE.
Definition 10. [Full-rank j∗ set-extension]
Let voter i ∈ N have a j∗(i) set extension. If in addition
λ
(i)
j > 0 ∀j ≤ j
∗(i),
then we say that voter i has a full-rank j∗(i)-set extension.
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Notice that the full-rank assumption is automatically satisfied in the single-
winner setting (i.e. k = 1). Thus, the consideration of full-rank and non-full-
rank set-extension utilities is a unique challenge faced in multi-winner election.
Also note that for any non-full-rank set-extension utility it can be approximated
arbitrarily well by a full-rank set-extension.
The following lemma states a more general version of Lemma 3 for when a
voter strictly prefers one committee over another, under the full-rank assump-
tion. The proof is left to the appendix. The intuition of the result is similar
to that of Lemma 3 and is implicit in the example provided as motivation for
full-rank set-extension utilities.
Lemma 4. Let W ′ ⊆ C such that c∗ ∈W ∗i and c
∗ /∈W ′ then if
W =W ′ ∪ {c∗}\{c} for some c ∈W ′ such that c∗ ≻i c,
we have
Ui(W ) ≥ Ui(W
′). (6)
Furthermore, under the full-rank assumption strict inequality holds for (6).
Given a (strict) preference profile ≻= (≻1, . . . ,≻n) and profile of set-
extension values (j∗(1), . . . , j∗(n)) , we define the ideal set of all voters
W ∗ = ∪i∈NW
∗
i
= ∪i∈N{voter i’s top j
∗(i) candidates in C}.
This is the union of all voters most preferred committee W ∗i (introduced in (5)).
The size of the set W ∗ is a measure of the diversity of voter preferences
modified by their j∗(i) set-extension value. For example if |W |∗ ≤ k there
is a high degree of consensus among voter preferences (after modifying for set-
extension values) and this can be accommodated with a k sized election. Whilst
if |W ∗| > k then voters have diverse preferences and no election outcome of size
k can accomodate all voter preferences.
Under the full-rank assumption, we show that the only lazy-PNE are when
W ∗ ⊆ W or W ( W ∗. Despite previous results showing undesirable outcomes
of lazy voting such as the non-existence of equilibria - this results highlights a
close connection between lazy-PNE and the top preferences of voters. This can
be viewed as a desirable property of lazy-PNE when they exist.
The intuition for the result is as follows; in equilibrium no candidate, say
c′, outside of the ideal set W ∗ can be elected, for if this were not the case
then there would exist some unelected candidate c ∈ W ∗ and at least one voter
will be able to profitably change their approval ballot to elect c instead of c′.
The lazy tendency of voters is crucial as it means in equilibrium at most k
candidates receive precisely one approval vote and all other candidate receive
none (Proposition 2) – and so, this ensures a deviation which elect c instead of c′
to exist. The full-rank assumption is then required to ensure such a deviation is
strictly profitable for the deviating voter (see Lemma 4). Without the full-rank
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assumption the voter may be indifferent between such a deviation, even if the
voter i ∈ N is such that c ∈ W ∗i .
Lemma 5. Under the full-rank assumption, if W is a lazy-PNE then either
W ∗ ⊆W or W (W ∗. (7)
Note that if the winning committee W is to be of size k then if |W ∗| ≤ k only
the former is possible, and if |W ∗| > k only the latter is possible.
Proof. Suppose for the purpose of a contradiction that W is a lazy-PNE sup-
ported by the ballot profile A but (7) does not hold. That is, there exists
c, c′ ∈ C such that
c ∈W ∗ c /∈W (8)
c′ /∈W ∗ c′ ∈W. (9)
Now since the tie-breaking priority ⊲ is a complete ordering either c ⊲ c′ or c′ ⊲ c.
In both instances if W is a lazy-PNE it must be that s(c′, A) = 0. To see
this note that since c′ ∈W we have s(c′, A) ≤ 1 (Proposition 2), if s(c′, A) = 1
then there exists a voter j such that c′ ∈ Aj and c′ /∈ W ∗j . Furthermore there
are at most k candidates with scores equal to 1. Now either W ∗j ⊆ W or not.
In the first case, voter j has their most ideal set elected which does not include
c′ and so removing this vote does not affect voter j’s utility and so under lazy
tendencies voter j will not submit c′ ∈ Aj . Alternatively, suppose that there
exists c∗ ∈W ∗j but c
∗ /∈ W , then clearly s(c∗, A) = 0 (Proposition 2). But now,
if voter j submits the alternate approval ballot
A′j =W ∪ {c
∗}\{c′}
then there will be precisely k candidates W ∪ {c∗}\{c′} with positive approval
scores s(·, A′). It follows that the new election outcome will be
W ′ = W ∪ {c∗}\{c′},
which is strictly preferred to W by voter i (Lemma 4). Thus we have a contra-
diction that Ai is a MBR ballot.
We conclude that s(c′, A) = 0, at most (k − 1) candidate receive non-zero
approval scores and s(c, A) = 0 (since c /∈ W ).
In the first instance, this gives a contradiction since both candidates c and c′
have zero approvals but c′ is elected despite having a lower lexicographic priority
rank.
In the second instance, a voter say i ∈ N with c ∈ W ∗i could submit the
alternate ballot
A′i =W ∪ {c}\{c
′}.
This will lead to precisely k candidates i.e. W ∪ {c}\{c′} receiving positive
approval scores s(·, A′), It follows that the new election outcome will be
W ′ = W ∪ {c}\{c′},
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which is strictly preferred to W by voter i (Lemma 4 and applying the full-rank
assumption) since c′ /∈ W ∗i . Thus we have a contradiction that Ai is a MBR
ballot.
We now consider the first case of a lazy-equilibrium where W ∗ ⊆ W . The
following theorem shows that if |W ∗| ≤ k, there is a unique lazy-PNE W which
containsW ∗. The intuition is straightforward; if every voter has their most ideal
set of candidates in C elected intoW (henceW ∗ ⊆W ) then every voter’s utility
from W is independent of candidates c′ /∈ W ∗ (even if c′ ∈ W ). Thus, since
voters are lazy every such candidate c′ /∈ W ∗ will receive zero votes. It follows
that any candidate c′ /∈ W ∗ but c′ ∈ W is elected based on the (lexicographic)
tie-breaking rule applied to the set of candidates with zero approval scores –
this necessarily leads to a unique set of candidates outside of W ∗ being elected.
Before formally presenting the result, we first introduce some notation which
will be utilised in a number of results of this subsection.
Label the candidate set C according to their lexicographic ordering (⊲) such
that
c1 ⊲ c2 ⊲ · · · ⊲ cm, (10)
where |C| = m. Similarly given a committeeW ⊆ C of size k, label the elements
according to the lexicographic ordering, say W = {w1, . . . , wk}. However, it
will be convenient to introduce a mapping σ : [k] → [m] which translates the
elements of W , say wj , to an element, say cσ(j) ∈ C. That is, we write the
elements of W as
W = {w1, . . . , wk}
= {cσ(1), . . . , cσ(k)}. (11)
such that σ(ℓ) < σ(ℓ′) for all ℓ < ℓ′ and so cσ(ℓ) ⊲ cσ(ℓ′).
Theorem 1. The committee W ⊆ C of size k such that
W ∗ ⊆W,
is a lazy-PNE if and only if for every c ∈ W −W ∗ has a higher priority than
every c′ /∈W .
Proof. Label the elements of W ∗ according to a mapping σ : [|W ∗|] → [m] (as
was done in (11)), i.e.
W ∗ = {cσ(1), . . . , cσ(ℓ)},
where ℓ ≤ k.
Now we construct a ballot profile A which satisfies the necessary conditions
for W such that W ∗ ⊆ W to be lazy-PNE. We start with cσ(ℓ). If σ(ℓ) ≤ k
then all candidates in W ∗ have a top k lexicographic ranking ⊲ in C i.e. W ∗ ⊆
{c1, . . . , ck}, thus s(c, A) = 0 for all c ∈ C is a lazy-PNE. This holds since all
voters have their ideal set W ∗i elected simply by the priority ⊲ when no votes
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are cast, and so no voter will have an incentive to deviate. Also all voters are
submitting MBR ballot since Ai = ∅ for all i ∈ N . In addition since W ∗i ⊆ W
for all i ∈ N , there can be no equilibrium whereby a candidate c ∈ W and
c /∈W ∗ has s(c, A) > 0. Thus, s(c, A) = 0 for all c /∈ W ∗ and the candidates in
W −W ∗ will be elected if and only if the second condition holds.
Otherwise, σ(ℓ) > k and some candidates in W are outside of the top k
lexicographic rankings in C. To construct a ballot profile A which supports W
as a lazy-PNE we do the following: initialise Ai = ∅ for all i ∈ N , select a voter
i such that cσ(ℓ) ∈W
∗
i and set Ai 7→ Ai ∪{cℓ}. Now consider candidate cσ(ℓ−1).
If σ(ℓ − 1) ≤ k − 1 then we are done since {cσ(1), . . . , cσ(ℓ−1)} ⊆ {c1, . . . , ck−1}
and W ∗ will be elected by the tie-breaking priority ⊲ if no additional votes are
cast. Otherwise, σ(ℓ − 1) > k − 1 and we select a voter, say i ∈ N , such that
cσ(ℓ−1) ∈ W
∗
i and set Ai 7→ Ai∪{cℓ−1}. Repeat this procedure for all candidates
in W ∗.
This is a lazy-PNE since all voters have their most preferred set W ∗i elected
- removing any approval will change the outcome to be strictly less desirable
(recall Lemma 3) and hence there is no incentive to elect any alternate candi-
dates (clearly no combination of these is optimal either). Again the candidates
in W −W ∗ are also elected if and only if the second condition holds.
We now present another key theorem which considers the second case where
W ( W ∗, or equivalently |W ∗| > k. The result gives necessary conditions for
an election outcome to be a lazy-PNE when the winning committee does not
contain the ideal set W ∗; that is, W ( W ∗. This result when restricted to
the k = 1 case, will then lead immediately to a theorem presented in Elkind et
al. [13].
The result is dependent on the lexicographic tie-breaking rule applied. The
first part of the theorem shows that the candidate elected into W in a lazy-
equilibrium with the lowest lexicographic tie-breaking preference (or rank) must
have a sufficiently low rank. This result may seem counter-intuitive since it im-
plies that if |W ∗| > k (i.e. a low degree of consensus among voter preferences)
the top-k candidates with respect to the tie-breaking can never form an equi-
librium – this is stated formally in Corollary 4. The intuition for the result is
as follows; if voters are lazy and support a high ranked (with respect to the tie-
breaking rule) candidate they have an incentive to remove their approval vote
and leave the election result up to the tie-breaking rule which their high ranked
candidate will win. Under unilateral deviations this is of course a (minimal)
best response but this generates an opportunity for other voters to be pivotable
an elect a different candidate which they prefer.
Informally speaking, the second part of the theorem shows that in equi-
librium every high ranked (with respect the tie-breaking rule) and unelected
candidate, say c˜, must be unanimously less preferred to the lowest ranked and
elected candidate c′8. The intuition follows from the fact that at most k candi-
8Technically speaking we only need unanimity among voter who derive utility from candi-
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dates in equilibrium receive non-zero approval scores and the rest receive zero
approvals in equilibrium (Proposition 2). Thus, any voter under a unilateral
deviation can elect the high ranked c˜ candidate – if W is an equilibrium it
must necessarily be the case that all voters agree that such a candidate c˜ is less
preferred to the lowest ranked and elected candidate c′ ∈ W
We now present the theorem formally but briefly recall some notation, the
elements of W can be expressed via the map σ as follows
W = {w1, . . . , wk}
= {cσ(1), . . . , cσ(k)}. (12)
such that σ(ℓ) < σ(ℓ′) for all ℓ < ℓ′ and so cσ(ℓ) ⊲ cσ(ℓ′).
Theorem 2. Let W = {cσ(1), . . . , cσ(k)} ( W
∗ be lazy-PNE. It must be that
σ(k) > k. Furthermore under the full-rank assumption, for all voters i ∈ N it
must be that if cσ(k) is among voter i’s top j
∗(i) most preferred candidates in
W for all cj /∈W with j < σ(k)
cσ(k) ≻i cj ∀i ∈ N.
Proof. For the first statement, suppose for the purpose of a contradiction that
W ( W ∗ is a lazy-PNE supported by the ballot profile A and σ(k) ≤ k. This
implies that there are k candidates in W with lexicographic priority rank at
least k and so it must be that
W = {c1, . . . , ck}.
From Proposition 2, it follows that s(c, A) ≤ 1 for all c ∈ W and s(c′, A) = 0
for all c′ /∈ W . If s(c, A) = 1 for any c ∈ W , then it can be shown that the voter
i ∈ N with c ∈ Ai is not submitting a MBR ballot since the priority ordering (⊲)
of c ensures that the alternate ballot A′i = Ai\{c} produces the same election
outcome. We conclude that Ai = ∅ for all i ∈ N and hence s(c, A) = 0 for all
c ∈ C. But if this is the case, then every voter i ∈ N can completely determine
the election outcome via a unilateral deviation and since W is a lazy-PNE it
follows that W ∗i ⊆ W for all i ∈ N . This contradicts the assumption that
W (W ∗.
For the final statement, we begin by noting that ifW is a lazy-PNE outcome
supported by the ballot profile A then σ(k) > k. Furthermore, recalling Propo-
sition 2 it must be that at most k candidates inW receive precisely one approval
vote and the remaining candidates receive zero approvals. For the purpose of a
contradiction suppose that voter i ∈ N is such that cσ(k) is among her top j
∗(i)
most preferred candidates in W and there exists cj /∈ W with
cj ≻i cσ(k).
date c′. That is, c′ is among voter i’s top j∗(i) most preferred candidates in W .
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We will show that voter i can change the election outcome to W ′ := W ∪
{cj}\{cσ(k)} which is strictly preferred by voter i under the full-rank assump-
tion.
Let W and W denote the set of candidates in W who receive an approval
score of 1 and 0, respectively under A. Consider the alternate ballot which voter
i could submit
A′i = W ∪ {cj} ∪ Ai\{cσ(k)}.
Under the ballot profile A′ = (A′i, A−i) the approval scores of all k candidates
in W ∪ {cj}\{cσ(k)} is precisely one approval and all other candidates, except
possibly cσ(k), receive zero approvals.
Candidate cσ(k) receives either zero or one approval. In the former case k
candidates have non-zero approvals and the rest have zero approvals and so the
new winning committee under A′ is W ′ := W ∪ {cj}\{cσ(k)}. In the latter
case the winning committee is still W ′ since candidate cσ(k) has the lowest tie-
breaking ranking among all k + 1 candidates in W ′ ∪ {cσ(k)}. This shows that
voter i can change the election outcome toW ′. It only remains to show that this
deviation is strictly profitable to voter i – under the full-rank assumption this
can be shown to hold in a similar manner to Lemma 4 and so is omitted. This
contradicts the assumption that W is a lazy-PNE and completes the proof.
An immediate corollary of the above theorem is as follows. The intuition
was discussed in the paragraph prior to Theorem 2.
Corollary 4. W = {c1, . . . , ck} is a lazy-PNE if and only if W ∗ ⊆ W . That
is, every voter’s ideal set is contained in the election outcome.
Combining the above statements leads to the following ‘if and only if’ corol-
lary for the single-winner setting (k = 1) which was shown in Elkind et al. [13].
Recall the notation from (12). The result shows that for a lazy-equilibrium in
single-winner election there must be a high degree of consensus among voters;
either all voters prefer a single candidate, or some candidate is elected who is
most preferred by at least one voter and candidate with higher tie-breaking rank
are unanimously less preferred.
Corollary 5. When k = 1 we have:
W = {cj} is a lazy-PNE if and only if
(i) cj is the first preferences of all voters
(ii) j > 1, cj is some voters top preference and for all ℓ < j we have that
cj ≻i cℓ ∀i ∈ N.
Proof. First note that if k = 1, then the full-rank assumption holds immediately.
We begin by proving the forward direction. Suppose W = {cj} is a lazy-
PNE, from Lemma 5, then either W ∗ ⊆ W or W ⊆ W ∗. Since k = 1, for each
i ∈ N the ideal set |W ∗i | = 1 and so W
∗ ⊆ W if and only if W ∗i = cj for all
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i ∈ N ; that is, cj is every voters first preference. If W ( W ∗ then statement
(ii) follows from Theorem 2.
We now prove the reverse direction. Suppose (i) holds then W ∗ = {cj} ⊆W
and so Theorem 1 shows that W is a lazy-PNE. Suppose (ii) holds then a lazy-
PNE is constructed by letting a voter i ∈ N with cj as their top preference
submit the ballot Ai = {cj} and all other voters submit Ai′ = ∅.
One may ask whether there is a relationship, such as set containment, of
equilibria when voters have full-rank and non-full-rank utilities. Unfortunately,
there does not appear to be an obvious relationship. It is straightforward to
construct examples such that an equilibrium with the full-rank assumption need
not be an equilibrium without this assumption, and conversely, an equilibrium
which holds when the full-rank assumption does not hold need not be an equi-
librium when it does. For brevity we omit such an example.
The results of this subsection highlight that under lazy voting, approval
voting rules can be inherently unstable if voters have diverse preferences i.e.
|W ∗| > k. As an implication this suggest that institutional features which
make voting more costly or encourage voters to submit MBR ballots, say via
a ballot-length restriction, may also generate instability. In this setting, the
cost of voting is not restricted to financial or time - some recent theoretical and
empirical work has looked at the effects of hidden (anonymous voting) or open
(non-anonymous voting) polls on voter behaviour (see Obraztsova et al. [29] and
Zou et al. [34]). The researchers suggest that social factors/benefits can drive
voter behaviour and the number of alternatives which they approve. Thus, it
is easy to also imagine social factors as being considered as a cost/benefit of
voting, especially when elections are highly controversial.
5.2. Truth-biased voting and sincere Nash
As seen in the previous section, ‘lazy’ voting has the undesirable property
of instability, via the non-existence of equilibria. In this subsection we consider
an alternative tendency of voters to be truthful rather than lazy, called truth-
bias. Such a tendency is more likely to arise when voting is costless and a
necessary condition is that ballot-length restrictions are not enforced. Thus the
analysis in this subsection provides a heuristic comparison of approval-based
elections without ballot-length restrictions and when voting is costless, against
the results of the previous subsection. The key result shows that an equilibrium
always exists under truth-bias tendencies contrasting against the non-existence
results shown when voters are lazy.
We begin by introducing the notion of sincere voting in an approval-based
setting. We then show that there always exists a best-response ballot which is
also sincere.
Informally, an approval ballot is said to be sincere if no candidate c who
is more preferred than an approved candidate c′ ∈ Ai remains unapproved
i.e. c /∈ Ai. This notion was introduced by Brams (1982) (see [3]). A formal
definition is provided below.
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Definition 11. [Sincere voting]
Let i ∈ N be a voter, we say that an approval ballot Ai ⊆ C is sincere if for all
c ∈ Ai and for all c′ ∈ C\Ai
c ≻i c
′.
We note that in this setting sincere voting is not a single voting action
but rather a characterisation of a class of voting actions which are all sincere.
In fact, for a given voter with strict preferences ≻i any sincere ballot can be
completely characterised by a threshold number of candidates that are approved.
This notion can also be extended to weak preferences by considering ordered
equivalence classes of candidates.
We now present a theorem showing the existence of a sincere best-response
approval ballot – this provides additional motivation for considering truth-bias
voting as a second-order tendency since it is compatible with utility maximising
behaviour under the ‘AV-rule’9. The result provides an efficient method for
a given voter to construct a sincere and best-response ballot. The proof is
left to the appendix, but follows by constructing a sincere and best response
ballot – this is achieved by considering a minimal best response ballot Ai and
simply approving of additional candidates such that the approval ballot is now
sincere. That is, the voter approves of every candidate in C which is more
preferred to a candidate in Ai to construct the sincere and best response ballot
A′i. Intuitively this ballot A
′
i maintains the voters maximal utility since the
voter only approves of more preferred candidates – the monotonicity properties
of the AV-rule ensures that this can not make the voter worse off.
Theorem 3. Let i ∈ N be a voter and a non-degenerate best-k voting rule. For
every ballot profile A−i there exists a sincere and best response (BR) ballot Ai
for voter i.
Notice that for any voter there are just (m + 1) sincere approval ballots.
Thus, the mere existence of a sincere and BR approval ballot means that a
voter can consider just (m + 1) approval ballots to determine and find a BR
ballot, rather than searching 2m approval ballots. This is an efficient method
for voters to construct a BR ballot.
The above theorem shows that submitting a sincere voting is a weakly domi-
nant strategy - however, it does not imply the existence of a sincere equilibrium
since sincere voting is not a single action. We also emphasise that the existence
of a sincere and best-response ballot does not mean the voting rule is strategy-
proof. On the contrary this suggest that even when a voter is restricted to
sincere approval ballots, strategic manipulations are still possible (see for exam-
ple Niemi [27]). Thus, the well-known conclusions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem [16, 31], and the multi-winner analog by Duggan and Schwartz [10],
do not apply.
9In fact, this compatibility holds more general for non-degenerate best-k scoring rules.
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Remark 2. As a point of clarification the above result appears to be in conflict
with the conclusions of the related work Laslier and Van der Straeten [19]. In
particular in Proposition 4 of their paper, it is shown that in general a voter
submitting a BR ballot may preclude the possibility of sincere voting. The re-
searchers consider a model of incomplete information (referred to as the score
uncertainty model) but show this result as the difference between the incomplete
and complete information settings become arbitrarily small.
The apparent conflict arises due to differences in the definition/description
of best response ballots. Under the formulation used by Laslier and Van der
Straeten [19] a best response ballot of a voter i is not simply an approval bal-
lot which maximises the expected utility for voter i under unilateral deviation.
Rather the best response ballot referred to in [19] corresponds to a ballot derived
from a sequence of pairwise comparisons and decisions upon which candidate to
include in the approval ballot. This formulation of BR is based on a behavioural
rule referred to as the ‘Leader Rule’ (see Laslier [18] for further details). Thus,
there is no conflict in the result presented in this paper and those presented in
Laslier and Van der Straeten [19].
Given Theorem 3, it is clear that a voter is never adversely affected by being
restricted to, or having a second-order preference for, sincere approval ballots.
That is, a sincere and best response approval ballot is guaranteed to exist. Thus,
the notion of sincere, or truth-bias, voting is compatible with utility maximising
voters. Formally we define truth-bias voting below.
Definition 12. [Truth-bias voting]
We shall say voters engage in truth-bias voting when given A−i they choose an
approval ballot Ai from the set of best response (BR) ballots to A−i which is
also sincere.
The truth-bias action only applies to the set of best-response ballots and
hence can be viewed as a second-order tendency since the preference for sincere
approval ballots is only applied after first maximising utility from the election
outcome. Below we define sincere equilibria which was also considered in [11]
as an equilibrium refinement.
Definition 13. [Sincere-PNE]
An election outcome W is a sincere-PNE supported by ballot profile A if no
voter has an incentive to unilaterally deviate under truth-bias voter preferences.
We denote an equilibrium pair by (W,A).
Note that even if a voter i is indifferent between submitting a sincere and
an insincere ballot (under unilateral deviations) the choice can have distinct
implications for other voters’ actions and then in turn produce different election
outcomes.
The next proposition shows that under truth-bias voting an equilibrium is
guaranteed to exists, so long as the number of voters exceeds the number of
candidates. This result is in contrast to the non-existence results shown when
voters are lazy. The intuition for the proposition is as follows: if voters are
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truth-biased and their ballot does not affect the election result then they have
no incentive to deviate (as long as the ballot is sincere). Whilst, under lazy
voting in such a situation a voter would remove their ballot entirely which not
only generates volatility in voter ballots but also creates greater opportunities
for voters to influence the election outcome.
More technically, the proof of the proposition constructs an equilibrium by
constructing ballot profiles which ensures that all voters vote sincerely (possibly
by abstaining) and the elected candidates have approval scores of at least two
and all other candidates have zero approvals. Thus, no single voter can influence
the election outcome and even though every non-abstaining voter need not vote
to maintain the election result – since voters are truth-biased rather than lazy
– there is no incentive to deviate.
Theorem 4. Assume n > m. A sincere Nash equilibrium always exists.
Proof. Given any positive integer k we provide construct an approval ballot
profile which is a sincere-PNE. Let E ⊆ C be the set of candidates who are the
first preference of some voter i ∈ N among candidates in C.
Since n > m by the pigeonhole principle (|E| ≤ |C| < m) there exists at
least one candidate, say c∗1 ∈ E, with at least two voters having c
∗
1 as their first
preference among candidates in C. Select this candidate c∗1 and for all voters i
who have c∗1 as their first preference let Ai = {c
∗
1}. Note that this is indeed a
sincere ballot.
Now update the set E to be the set of candidates who are the first preference
of some voter i ∈ N among candidates in C\{c∗1}. The set E includes candidates
which are the second preference of voters who had c∗1 as their first preference.
The size of E is at mostm−1 and there are still n voters and so by pigeonhole
principle there exists at least one candidate, say c∗2, with at least two voters with
c∗2 in their first preference among candidates in C\{c
∗
1}. For all such voters let
Ai → Ai ∪ {c2}, again this is a sincere ballot.
Repeating this process a total of k times. We end up with k candidates each
with approval scores at least two and only sincere approval ballots. This is a
sincere-PNE, since any single voter changing their approval ballot can alter the
score of candidates by at most one.
If we require that voters submit non-empty approval ballot then for any
remaining voters with Ai = ∅ can simply submit approval ballots Ai = C which
does not change any of the relative approval scores and is also sincere.
The above proposition shows a sense of stability under truth-biased voting
due to the guaranteed existence of equilibria, which was not present under lazy
voting. This can be seen as a desirable effect of reducing the cost of voting and
not implementing ballot-length restrictions. However, this ‘stability’ comes at a
cost since the equilibria outcome may be less reasonable than under lazy voting.
As seen in the previous subsection for lazy-PNE there is a close relationship
between equilibria W and the ideal set W ∗ (see Lemma 5) - this relationship
no longer holds under truth-bias voting. The following examples illustrates this
point.
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Example 2. [Lazy vs sincere PNE]
Consider the situation where k = 2, C = {a, b, c, d} and N = {1, 2, 3} with
full-rank utilities and strict preferences
≻1: a, b, c, d
≻2,≻3: c, d, a, b.
If j∗(1) = 1 and j∗(2) = j∗(3) = 2 then the election W = {a, b} is a sincere-PNE
supported by
A1 = {a, b} and A2 = A3 = ∅.
This is despite W ∗ = {a, c, d}. However, such an outcome can not be sustained
under lazy voting since we require that either W ∗ ⊆ W or W ⊆ W ∗. In fact,
the unique lazy-PNE is W = {a, c}.
If voter utilities are considered comparable and voter 2 and 3 are identical,
we see that the combined utility of voters in the sincere-PNE W = {a, b} is
λ
(1)
1 u1(a) + 2
(
λ
(1)
1 u2(a) + λ
(1)
2 u2(b)
)
, (13)
whilst under the lazy-PNE W = {a, c} the combined utility is
λ
(1)
1 u1(a) + 2
(
λ
(1)
1 u2(c) + λ
(1)
2 u2(a)
)
,
which is strictly greater than (13). Thus the lazy-PNE is socially more desirable.
6. Conclusion
In this work we considered how voters vary their approval ballot-lengths for
differing utility functions. In particular, we characterised the length of minimal
best-response (MBR) ballots. MBR ballots are a key object when considering
the effects of ballot-length restrictions, since if a MBR ballot exceeds the restric-
tion then no best-response (BR) ballot will be a feasible ballot. Thus, we were
able to provide clear results into when a ballot-length restriction would prevent
a voter from achieving their maximal utility under unilateral deviations. This
led to two key insights; firstly, if ballot-lengths are restricted to the size of the
committee to be elected then no voter will ever be prevented from submitting a
BR ballot, secondly, voters whose utility does not depend on all of the elected
candidates are less likely to be affected by ballot-length restrictions.
We then presented equilibria analysis for voters with second-order tendencies
such as laziness and truth-bias. The key results showed that lazy voting is
inherently unstable since equilibria need not exist, whilst the opposite holds
for truth-bias voting. This suggest that institutional features which increase
the cost of voting or ballot-length restriction may encourage lazy voting and
hence generate instability. This however, should be coupled with the fact that
equilibria (when they exist) under lazy voting appear to be more desirable.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3. To prove this statement we utilise the dot-product interpre-
tation of utilities (recall Equations (1) and (2)) i.e. for a given set S ⊆ C of size
k
Ui(S) = λ · uˆS := λ(i) ·
(
ui(c1), . . . , ui(cj), . . . , ui(cj∗)
)
,
where λ(i) ∈ Rj
∗
≥0, λj∗(i) > 0 and uˆS is an ordered (descending) vector of voter
i’s utility from their j∗ most preferred candidates in S. We denote voter i’s j-th
most preferred candidate in S by cj ∈ S.
Now label the elements of W and W ′ according i’s preferences so that
W = {c1, . . . , cj∗ , . . . , ck} and W
′ = {c′1, . . . , c
′
j∗ , . . . , c
′
k}.
Now since W ∗i ⊆W we have
W ∗i = {c1, . . . , cj∗}.
That is, voter i’s j∗ most preferred candidates in W and C coincide. Now
consider the elements of W ′ for every j ≤ j∗ we have
ui(c
′
j) ≤ ui(cj).
Now suppose that we have equality for all j, then it must be that c′j = cj for all
j ≤ j∗ since preferences are strict. But then W ∗i ⊆W
′ which is a contradiction.
And so it must be that strict inequality hold for at least one j ≤ j∗, say j = ℓ
(let ℓ be the smallest such positive integer where strict inequality is attained).
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If ℓ = j∗, then we have Ui(W ) > Ui(W
′) since uˆW ≥ uˆW ′ (component-wise
inequality) and uˆW 6= uˆW ′ and the component such that strict inequality is
attained occurs at ℓ = j∗ where λj∗(i) > 0.
Now assume ℓ < j∗, we can attain a similar conclusion since it must be that
ui(c
′
ℓ+1) < ui(cℓ+1).
This follows from the fact that if ui(c
′
j) < ui(cj) it must be that ui(c
′
j) ≤
ui(cj+1), and so
ui(c
′
j+1) < ui(c
′
j) ≤ ui(cj+1).
Hence the same conclusion follows that ui(W ) > ui(W
′).
Proof of Lemma 4. Label the elements of W and W ′ according i’s preferences
so that
W = {c1, . . . , cj∗ , . . . , ck} and W
′ = {c′1, . . . , c
′
j∗ , . . . , c
′
k}.
Now c∗ ∈W ∗i ∩W and suppose c
∗ = cℓ ∈W for some ℓ ≤ j∗. It follows that
ui(cj) ≥ ui(c
′
j) ∀j ≤ j
∗,
with strict inequality holding for j = ℓ since c∗ = cℓ /∈W ′. Thus,
Ui(W ) ≥ Ui(W
′).
Now if λj > 0 for all j ≤ j∗(i) and noting that c∗ is necessarily among voter
i’s top j∗(i) most preferred candidates in W we have
Ui(W ) > Ui(W
′).
Thus, under the full-rank assumption the final statement in the lemma follows.
Proof of Theorem 3. Denote voter i’s set-extension value by j∗. Let Ai be voter
i’s MBR ballot leading to election outcome W which maximises utility Ui(W ).
Denote the elements of Ai as
Ai = {c1, . . . , cℓ},
such that c1 ≻i c2 ≻i · · · ≻i cℓ. Note that |Ai| = ℓ ≤ j
∗ by Lemma 2.
The proof is inductive, and so we show that adding a candidate c ≻i cℓ and
c /∈ Ai to voter i’s ballot can not reduce the utility and hence remains a best-
response. First note that if c ∈ W , then Ai ∪ {c} does not change the election
outcome, by the monotonically robust property, and so it is also a best response
and we are done.
Now, let c /∈ W such that c ≻i cℓ and consider
A′i = Ai ∪ {c},
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with outcomeW ′. Since Ai is a best response it must be that Ui(W
′) ≤ Ui(W ).
If equality holds, then we are done. For the purpose of a contradiction suppose
that strict inequality holds i.e.
Ui(W
′) < Ui(W ), (14)
and so W ′ 6= W . Equation (14) combined with the monotonically robust prop-
erty implies that
W ′ = (W ∪ {c})\{c′},
for some c′ ≻i c ≻i cℓ, so that c replaces a more preferred candidate c′ in the
winning committee. Note that cℓ ∈W ′ since c′ 6= cℓ.
Now consider A−1i = Ai\{cℓ} with outcome W
−1. Since Ai is a MBR and
|A−1i | < |Ai| it must be that Ui(W
−1) < Ui(W ) and so W
−1 6= W . Again by
the monotonically robust property it must be that
W−1 = (W ∪ {cL})\{cℓ}, (15)
for some cL such that cℓ ≻i cL. That is, cℓ is replaced with a less preferred
candidate cL in the winning committee. Note that cℓ /∈ W−1.
Now consider Aˆi = A
−1
i ∪ {c} with outcome Wˆ . Since Aˆi is simply a rein-
forcement of c from A−1i it must be that
Wˆ =
{
W−1 or,
W−1 ∪ {c}\{e} for some e ∈W−1,
(16)
by the monotonically robust property. That is, either no change occurs to the
winning committee, or c is added to the committee and some other previously
elected candidate is removed. But note also that Aˆi = A
′
i\{cℓ}, and so A
′
i is
a reinforcement of cℓ from Aˆi, this implies that (again by the monotonically
robust property)
W ′ =
{
Wˆ or,
Wˆ ∪ {cℓ}\{f} for some f ∈ Wˆ .
(17)
But recall that cℓ /∈W
−1 and c 6= cℓ and so by (16)
cℓ /∈ Wˆ . (18)
Now equation (17) implies that W ′ = Wˆ . But cℓ ∈ W ′ and so cℓ ∈ Wˆ which
contradicts (18).
This shows the required result when Ai is a MBR, inductively we can repeat
this process to generate a sincere and best response ballot.
The only point of clarification required is in step (15), however any updated
Ai which is a BR but no longer MBR will still satisfy this result. This follows
from the fact that replacing Ai with Ai ∪ {c} means that A
−1
i = Ai ∪ {c}\{cℓ}
is simply a reinforcement of c with respect to the original MBR ballot. We
conclude that the only possible change is that c ∈ W−1 - which means that cℓ
will still never be in the outcome W−1. Thus, the induction holds.
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